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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Sections 78A-3102(3)0') and 78A-3-102(4).
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1: Whether the district court correctly found, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Mr. Herbert engaged in a course of conduct of two or more acts directed at
or toward Ms. Butters as required by Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-106.5.
Standard of Review. Clear error: The Appellate Court "review[s] the trial court's
findings of fact for clear error, reversing only where [a] finding is against the clear weight
of the evidence, or if [it] otherwise reach[es] a firm conviction that a mistake has been
made." Ellison v. Stain, 2006 UT App. 150,1j 17, 136 P.3d 1242 (quoting ProMax Dev.
Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 255 (Utah Ct.App.1997)). Further, "[i]n order to
estabUsh that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, '[a]n appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this evidence,
the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the
evidence.5" Ellsworth Paulsen Const v. 51-SPR, LLC, 2006 UT App 353, ^ 26, 144 P. 3d
261 (quoting Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 19, 100 P.3d 1177).
ISSUE 2: Whether the district court correctly relied on the definition of
"emotional distress" set forth in the current stalking injunction statutes, rather than the
outrageous and intolerable standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Standard of Review, Correctness: "The proper interpretation and application of a statute
is a question of law which [the Appellate Court] review[s] for correctness, affording no
deference to the district court's legal conclusion^]." Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150,
If 16,136 P.3d 1242 (quoting Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-15 (Utah 1998)).
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ISSUE 3: Whether the district court appropriately awarded Petitioner her
attorneys' fees under Utah Code Annotated Section 77-3a-101(16), and should she be
awarded her fees incurred on appeal?
Standard of Review, Abuse of Discretion: The "calculation of reasonable attorney fees is
in the sound discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned in the absence of a
showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Colonial Building Supply, LLC v. Constr.
Assocs., Inc., 2011 UT App 149,110 (citing Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 P.2d 985,
988 (Utah 1988)). Further, "an award of attorney fees must be supported by evidence in
the record." Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
i

CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Material statutory provisions in this appeal are Utah Code Annotated Sections 773a-101 and 76-5-106.5. The statutes are lengthy and included in the addenda to the Brief
of Appellant
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Procedural History
Petitioner/Appellee Aiona Butters ("Ms. Butters") filed a request for an ex parte
stalking injunction against Nathan Gary Herbert ("Mr. Herbert") on August 5, 2010. (R.
15.) The request was granted on August 10, 2010. (R. 17.) Mr. Herbert requested a
hearing, which was held on November 12 and 17, 2010. (R. 24,284-295.) After the twoday hearing with evidence and testimony from multiple witnesses presented on both sides,
the District Court found that the evidence and testimony supported imposing a three-year
stalking injimction against Mr. Herbert. (R. 285.) The Honorable James Taylor signed the
order granting the civil stalking injunction and served the same on Mr. Herbert in open
court on November 17, 2011. (R. 285:184-185.) Mr. Herbert now appeals that decision.
Statement of Facts
MR. HERBERT FIRST SEES MS. BUTTERS AT RIVERWOODS IN 2004
1.

In 2004, Ms. Butters' sister, Talei Moana Weingarten Akana ("Ms.

Akana"), spent some time socializing with Mr. Herbert, including a final incident where
Mr. Herbert drove Ms. Akana from Utah County to Salt Lake City during a winter night
with icy roads. As Mr. Herbert's car was sliding on the roadway, Ms. Akana pled for him
not to take her to Salt Lake City. However, Mr. Herbert continued driving, with Ms.
Akana crying and gripping the car. (R. 284:28.) Ms. Akana's mother had also requested
that Mr. Herbert not drive to Salt Lake City because of road conditions. (R. 284:40.)
2.

Thereafter, in December 2004, Ms. Akana was shopping at Papaya and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Company, a store formerly located in the Riverwoods shopping center in Provo, Utah,
withfriendsand family (including Ms. Butters). Ms. Akana's mother said she saw Mr.
Herbert outside of the store. Ms. Akana, Ms. Butters, and afriendhid in the very back of
the store. Mr. Herbert entered the store and came straight to the hiding women. He asked
them if they were hiding from him, and Ms. Akana said that they were hiding. This
incidence was the first time Mr. Herbert had contact with and saw Ms. Butters. (R.
284:28-30.)
3.

Ms. Butters specifically remembered Mr. Herbert's direct stare during the

Riverwoods encounter. (R. 284:45.)
MR. HERBERT INNAPROPRIATELY TOUCHES HIMSELF WHILE
WATCHING MS. BUTTERS FROM BEHIND AT GOLD'S GYM IN THE
WINTER OF 2004-2005
4.

After the encounter at Riverwoods, while Ms. Butters was exercising at

Gold's Gym5 a woman approached Ms. Butters and told her that a man was watching her
from behind and inappropriately touching himself. Ms. Butters turned around, made eye
contact with Mr. Herbert, and saw him touching himself (his hand was on his genitals
over his pants). Then Mr. Herbert left the area and went to the men's room. (R. 284:2627; 284:46-48.)
5.

Ms. Butters hoped that Mr. Herbert was doing something besides

masturbating, such as adjusting himself for comfort. (R. 284:66.) ..'
6.

Further, Ms. Butters tried to reason in her mind that Mr. Herbert would not

be inappropriately touching himself in public. She wanted to give him the benefit of the
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doubt and tried to forget the incident. However, she did tell Ms. Akana about the incident.
(R. 284:48-49.)
MR, HERBERT ASSAULTS MS. BUTTERS5 SISTER AND VIOLATES THE
ENSUING PROTECTIVE ORDER
7.

On July 18, 2005, Mr. Herbert approached Ms. Akana while she was seated

in her vehicle on BYU campus, yelled at her, and assaulted her (by choking and shaking
her). (R. 284:9-10.)
8.

Ms. Akana's mother testified that Ms. Akana had a sore throat and raspy

voice for days after the assault. (R. 284:43.) The assault wasfrighteningfor Ms. Akana's
mother and emotionally and physically traumatic for Ms. Akana. (R. 284:43.)
9.

As a result of the assault and the history of the parties, Ms. Akana obtained

a protective order and civil stalking injunction against Mr. Herbert ("2005 Injunction").
(R. 284:4; see also Addendum, Plaintiffs Exhibits 1 and 2.)1
10.

Ms. Butters was also included as a protected person on the 2005 Injunction

as a result of the Gold's Gym incident where Mr. Herbert was watching her from behind
while touching himself. (R. 284:4, 284:10.)
11.

Due to the 2005 assault on Ms. Akana, Mr. Herbert was also restrained

from going on BYU campus.2 (R. 284:10.)
1

True and correct copies of relevant exhibits admitted into evidence at the hearing are
included in the Addendum. Exhibits 1 and 2 admitted at the hearing (and included
herewith) are not signed due to the 2005 case being sealed, but the parties and the court
acknowledged that they matched the original signed copies. (R. 284:17-18, 43-44.)
2
During the hearing, Mr. Herbert also admitted to being banned for periods of time from
the University Mall andfromUtah Valley University. (R. 285:85.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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12.

In spite of the restraining order, Ms. Akana and her family (Ms. Butters was

not there at the time) witnessed Mr. Herbert on BYU campus in the Harris Fine Arts
Center in August 2005. (R. 284:14-16.)
13.

Mr. Herbert admitted to seeing Ms. Butter's and Ms. Akana's parents as

they were coming out from a production. (R. 285:64.)
14.

Ms. Akana and her family watched Mr. Herbert go up the stairs in the

center area, and they thought he left the building. (R. 284:12.)
15.

However, Ms. Akana and her family saw Mr. Herbert again after they

exited the building. They saw Mr. Herbert running out of the building, apparently looking
for them. (R. 284:14.) One of the family members with an injured leg sat on a bench by
the exit and saw Mr. Herbert running after the rest of the family. (R. 284:27.)
16.

Ms. Akana's father confirmed that Mr. Herbert ran out of the building and

apparently could not find Ms. Akana and her family because they were in a dark area to
the side of the building. (R. 284:33.)
17.

Ms. Akana's mother confirmed that the family member sitting on the bench

was unseen by Mr. Herbert and that Mr. Herbert came out of the building looking toward
where the rest of the family had gone. (R. 284:39-40.)
18.

The 2005 Injunction against Mr. Herbert (naming Ms. Akana and Ms.

Butters) expired March 22,2009. (R. 284:49.)
19.

For the period of the 2005 Injunction, Ms. Butters did not have any

problems with Mr. Herbert. (R. 284:50:10.)

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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MR. HERBERT DRIVES AT MS. BUTTERS AND CIRCLES MS. BUTTERS'
CAR IN THE SMITH'S PARKING LOT
20.

Shortly after the 2005 restraining order expired on March 22, 2009, in April

2009, Ms. Butters drove to Smith's in Orem. As she was walking into the building she
saw Mr. Herbert driving at her very fast. He stopped his car. Then started circling Ms.
Butters' car in his car approximately ten times for at least several minutes. (R. 284:52.)
21.

The incident made Ms. Butters "really upset" because she remembered the

Gold's Gym incident where Mr. Herbert had been touching himself while watching her,
and the incident where Mr. Herbert choked her sister. (R. 284:53.) She was scared by Mr.
Herbert circling her car. (R. 284:74.)
22.

Ms. Butters called the police to report the incident, but Mr. Herbert left

before any police arrived. (R. 284:53.)
MR. HERBERT APPROACHES AND STARES AT MS. BUTTERS IN
UNIVERSITY MALL PARKING LOT AT A TIME WHEN MR. HERBERT WAS
BANNED FROM BEING AT THE UNIVERSITY MALL
23.

In July 2009, while in the parking lot at University Mall in Orem, Ms.

Butters had her two year old and newborn with her and was trying to figure out how her
new double stroller worked at the back of her vehicle. (R. 284:54.)
24.

Working the stroller proved difficult, and Ms. Butters called her husband

for assistance. While continuing to work on her stroller, Ms. Butters noticed somebody
walk to the front of her car and then down the side until he was standing just feet from
her. Ms. Butters looked up, saw it was Mr. Herbert, and told her husband on the phone.
Mr. Herbert then backed up, walked to the entrance of the mall, and stared at Ms. Butters
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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from behind some pillars. (R. 284:55-56.)
25.

After she saw Mr. Herbert continuing to stare at herfromthe pillars, Ms.

Butters threw the stroller into her car and left, without going into the mall. (R. 284:82.)
26.

Ms. Butters called the University Mall police to report Mr. Herbert's

presence because she knew they work in conjunction with the Orem Police and because
she knew that at least at one point Mr. Herbert was bannedfromthe University Mall. (R.
284:57,284:82.)
27.

The incident upset Ms. Butters. (R. 284:83.)

MR. HERBERT APPROACHES AND STARES AT MS. BUTTERS AT THE
OREM PUBLIC LIBRARY
28.

In January 2010, Ms. Butters was at the Orem Public Library. She felt

somebody stand directly behind her and discovered Mr. Herbert was standing directly
behind her in line while she was waiting to check out a book. (R. 284:57.)
29.

Mr. Herbert had a "leering" smile on his face and leaned forward towards

Ms. Butters. She dropped her book and rushed out to her vehicle, parked directly outside
of the hbrary entrance. She saw Mr. Herbert run out after her. Ms. Butters was shaking in
fear as a result of the encounter. (R. 284:58, 284:85.)
30.

Ms. Butters reported the incident to the police. (R. 284:58.)
AUGUST 4,2010 GOLD'S GYM INCIDENT

31.

On August 4,2010, Ms. Butters went to Gold's Gym to exercise and parked

her vehicle directly infrontof the building, where it was plainly visible to anyone looking
from inside to the outside of the building. (R. 284:59.)
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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32.

As Ms. Butters walked into the gym, Mr. Herbert walked out of the gym.

When Mr. Herbert saw Ms. Butters he had a "glazed fixated look over his face." Ms.
Butters told Mr. Herbert to please leave her alone. Ms. Butters continued inside the gym
and saw Mr. Herbert circling her car on foot at least five times. (R. 284:59.)
33.

As Mr. Herbert circled Ms. Butters' car, he walked slowly and looked into

the car' s windows. Mr. Herbert's behavior scared Ms. Butters and she went to an
employee and asked if she could stand by him. At that point she did not scan her card, but
was motivated to stand with an employee for protection. (R. 284:60.)
34.

Mr. Herbert re-entered the gym, walked approximately 20 feet behind Ms.

Butters, and began pacing while staring at Ms. Butters for approximately one minute. (R.
284:60.)
35.

Mr. Herbert's behavior scared Ms. Butters and made her feel like he was

"raping her with his eyes." (R. 284:60-61.)
36.

The employee she had been standing with took her to the Gold's Gym

assistant manager, Tyler Phillips. (R. 284:61; 284:149.) Mr. Phillips testified that Ms.
Butters was "[ojbviously... in distress." (R. 284:149.) At that point Mr. Herbert walked
over to a weight bench but continued watching Ms. Butters rather than facing the
equipment. Then Mr. Herbert moved to an elliptical and continued watching Ms. Butters.
Then Mr. Herbert left the gym. (R. 284:61.) Mr. Phillips saw Mr. Herbert staring at Ms.
Butters from the weight bench and elliptical. (R. 284:150.)
37.

Ms. Butters called the police to report the incident, and they advised her to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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come to the station to fill out a stalking injunction request. (R. 284:61.)
38.

Ms. Butters waited for a short time, because she was afraid of where Mr.

Herbert could have been. Then she went to the Orem Police Station. (R. 284:62.)
39.

Ms. Butters requested documents and police reports to attach to the stalking

injunction request, assuming the police would provide her with all the documentation she
needed. (R. 284:70-71.)
40.

When Ms. Butters was at the police station, she started feeling comfort and

protection, until she was informed that Mr. Herbert had just been at the same window at
the police station shortly before her. She immediately started crying and shaking. The
police escorted her to a room and arranged to have an officer move her car; they escorted
her out of the building while Mr. Herbert was on the second floor of the building. (R.
284:63.)
41.

Tara Calancea, the Customer Service Specialist at the Orem Police

Department who interacted with both Ms. Butters and Mr. Herbert, said that when Ms.
Butters learned Mr. Herbert had been at the station Ms. Butters cried "for quite a few
minutes" and that she "had never seen someone that upset before . . . . " (R. 284:119.)
42.

Ms. Calancea found Mr. Herbert's behavior at the station strange: she was

surprised Mr. Herbert would come to the station purportedly to resolve a parking ticket
that had already been resolved; an issue that normally takes five minutes to resolve took
over an hour for Mr. Herbert; and Mr. Herbert seemed very distracted, repeatedly looking
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around, listening in, needing the same question answered multiple times.3 (R. 284:113;
284:117; 284:120-122.)
43.

After Mr. Herbert was done discussing his ticket with Ms. Calancea, Mr.

Herbert milled around the police station, going into some rooms, and wandering up and
down the hallway. (R. 284:122; 284:123.)
44.

Ms. Calancea left for her lunch after interacting with Mr. Herbert and Ms.

Butters. When Ms. Calancea returned she saw Mr. Herbert walking up and down the rows
of cars. At least three hours had passed from the time that Mr. Herbert had first come to
the police station to the time Ms. Calancea saw Mr. Herbert in the parking lot. (R.
284:124.)
45.

Ms. Butters filed the restraining order against Mr. Herbert the next day,

August 5, 2010. (R. 284:63.)
AUGUST 11, 2010 GOLD'S GYM INCIDENT
46.

Ms. Butters waited approximately a week before she went back to the gym.

She took the stalking injunction with her to notify Gold's Gym that Mr. Herbert was not
allowed at that location. (R. 284:63-64.)

3

In testimony that went un-contradicted by Mr. Herbert, Ms. Calancea testified as to a
separate event. She and her 4-year-old son were in the restroom in Cold Stone at the
University Mall shortly before the hearing took place. The restroom door would not lock,
so she was standing next to the door while her son used the toilet. Suddenly Mr. Herbert
came bursting into the room holding his crotch, claiming he needed to use the restroom.
She requested he leave the room, and he ran out the door. (R. 284:125-126) Ms. Calancea
said she "was surprised by a lot of things
[Mr. Herbert] just flung the door wide open
as he entered. He was a grown man holding himself, that surprised me." (R. 284:133.)
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47.

Ms. Butters felt safe enough to exercise after providing the stalking

injunction. However, when she was about to leave, she was informed that Mr. Herbert
had been at the gym for the entire time that Ms. Butters had been there. Then Ms. Butters
saw Mr. Herbert come out of the manager's office. When he exited the building, he
turned around and stared in at the entrance where Ms. Butters was standing. (R. 284:64.)
48.

Mr. Josh Workman of the Governor's security detail who accompanied Mr.

Herbert that day noted that the incident caused Ms. Butters to be visibly upset. (R.
284:218.)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly found that Mr. Herbert engaged in a course of conduct
sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for a civil stalking injunction. The trial
court specifically found five incidents to support the fact that Mr. Herbert approached,
monitored, observed, or confronted Ms. Butters. In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Herbert
attempts to marshal the evidence by omitting or mischaracterizing testimony and
distorting the facts as established by the evidence. As such, Mr. Herbert's efforts fail and
this Court should deny the relief he seeks.
Further, the trial court, which is in the best position to assess testimony and
evidence as presented by the parties, supported its findings with a detailed assessment of
every incident between the parties. The trial court found some of the evidence in favor of
both parties, but ruled that Ms. Butters was more credible than Mr. Herbert. As such,
under parts (a) and (b) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2), Ms. Butters met her burden by
a preponderance of the evidence.
The issue of outrageous and intolerable conduct being the emotional distress
standard for a stalking injunction was not preserved by Mr. Herbert at trial. And it does
not constitute the correct legal standard, as the stalking injunction statute itself provides a
definition for "emotional distress."
Finally, the trial court also correctly applied the provision for attorney's fees. Mr.
Herbert cites the rule, but fails to address the issue in any substantive manner. He simply
opposes Ms. Butters being awarded her fees, as any losing party does.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Thus, this Court should affirm the stalking injunction at issue, affirm the award of
attorneys' fees, and award Ms. Butters her attorney's fees and costs incurred on appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. HERBERT FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
The Brief of Appellant fails to appropriately marshal the evidence sufficient to

support a reversal of the trial court's ruling. The Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
require "[a] party challenging a fact finding [to] first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). The marshaling requirement
is "not intended to gratuitously oppress an appellant; rather it exists to facilitate a
structured, realistic, and skeptical appraisal of facts without unduly compromising the
adversarial process." In the Matter ofE.H.v. R.C andS.C, 2006 UT 36, If 64, 137P.3d
809. At its core, the "duty to marshal evidence contemplates that an appellant present
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists and then ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence, becoming a devil's
advocate." Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted). "In sum, to properly marshal the
evidence the challenging party must demonstrate how the court found the facts from the
evidence and then explain why those findings contradict the clear weight of the
evidence." United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Foods, 2006 UT
35, f 26,140 P.3d 1200 (internal citation omitted).
Finally, the Supreme Court has "repeatedly... warned of the grim consequences
parties face when they fail to fulfill the marshaling requirement." Id. at f 27. When an
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appellant fails to perform this "critical task," the Court "rel[ies] on that failure to affirm
the lower court's findings of fact." Id; see also In the Matter ofE.K, 2006 UT 36, f 65;
Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, f 19, 164 P.3d 384 ("[P]arties that fail
to marshal the evidence do so at the risk that the reviewing court will decline, in its
discretion, to review the trial court's factual findings.5').
In this appeal, Mr. Herbert has failed to marshal the evidence, and he failed to
show how the evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the District Court's
finding, is insufficient. His arguments include conclusory statements that the evidence
was legally insufficient to support the trial court's finding that Mr. Herbert engaged in a
course of conduct directed at Ms. Butters.
Further, in his "statement of facts," Mr. Herbert repeatedly failed to identify
damning testimony and evidence. For example, Mr. Herbert omitted or distorted a
significant amount of testimony and evidence.4 While Mr. Herbert acknowledges that Ms.
Butters first saw Mr. Herbert when he came into the store at Riverwoods, he fails to note
that the incident was the first time he saw Ms. Butters as well. In fact, Ms. Akana testified
that she hid with Ms. Butters at the back of the store and that Mr. Herbert came straight to
them. (R. 284:29.) Further, Ms. Butters testified that he "was looking directly at us." (R.
284:45.) The fact that Ms. Butters testified that Mr. Herbert did not enter the store to talk

4

The Factual History section of the Brief of Appellant Nathan Gary Herbert (Appellant's
Brief, at 3-8) contains no citations to the record but includes numerous misrepresentations
of testimony and evidence. The Statement of Facts section appears to retain the same
inaccuracies. As such, Ms. Butters' cites only to those inaccuracies that Mr. Herbert
claims to be supported by the record.
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with or interact with Ms. Butters does not change the fact that Mr. Herbert saw Ms.
Butters. (R. 284:65.)
Likewise, Mr. Herbert fails to note that in the Gold's Gym incident in the winter of
2004-2005, not only did a third party female tell Ms. Butters that a man was watching Ms.
Butters from behind and inappropriately touching himself, but Ms. Butters turned around,
made eye contact with Mr. Herbert, saw Mr. Herbert's hands on his genitals, and at the
moment Mr. Herbert saw that Ms. Butters had seen him, he went straight into the men's
room. (R. 284:48.) Further, Mr. Herbert characterizes Ms. Butters' testimony as an
admission that it was very possible that Mr. Herbert was simply adjusting himself or
getting comfortable. (Appellant's Brief at 9.) However, Ms. Butters qualified that
admission stating that she "hope[d]" Mr. Herbert was adjusting himself. (R. 284:66.)
Mr. Herbert attempts to demonstrate a contradiction in Ms. Butters' testimony with
respect to the Smith's incident in April 2009. (Appellant's Brief at 11.) No contradictions
exist. The clearest evidence regarding Ms. Butters' parking space was an aerial
photograph where Ms. Butters marked her spot with an "A" and circled it. (R. 285:89; see
also Addendum, Defendant's Exhibit 9.) Prior to marking her space on the aerial
photograph, Ms. Butters testified she "was parked in an end spot and there was an empty
space next to me

" (R. 284:71.) Further, Ms. Butters testified "there was no parking

space in front of me. At the very, very, very end [of her row] toward the road [infrontof
Smith's] it's just one row of cars and mine was at the very, very end of that particular
parking stall and there was not a car parked right next to me

" (R. 284:72.)
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Ms. Butters' testimony is entirely consistent with the aerial photograph. Ms.
Butters also drew a picture of her recollection of the parking lot (Addendum, Defendant's
Exhibit 4) and testified regarding the drawing, which while consistent, the drawing and
testimony are not as clear as the testimony regarding the actual aerial photograph. (R.
284:72-73.) Mr. Herbert appears to confuse Ms. Butters' usage of the road in front of the
Smith's entrance with the perpendicular Orem Center Street outside of the parking lot.
However, the Smith's store manager, Ms. Jane Becker, confirmed that there were no
obstructions that would have prevented Mr. Herbert from driving around Ms. Butters' car
as she had described. (R. 285:8.)
Mr. Herbert also distorts Ms. Butters' testimony regarding her reporting the
Smith's incident to the police. Ms. Butters testified she was crying and shaking in fear as
a result of Mr. Herbert driving around her car repeatedly. (R. 284:75-76.) Ms. Butters
called the police to report the incident. (R. 284:75.) However, the police called Ms.
Butters back by the time she was at home. (R. 284:76.) Even though she was at home, Ms.
Butters was still shaking and crying, but by that time she was not so uncontrollable that
the police had to ask her to calm down, and thus the conversation with the police "wasn't
that dramatic." (R. 284:76.) Mr. Herbert mischaracterizes Ms. Butters' testimony. He
attempts to associate the specific line of questioning about reporting an incident after the
fact from home as being not "that dramatic" (Appellant's Brief at 11) with the entire
Smith's incident, which was clearly veryfrighteningand distressing to Ms. Butters. It is
reasonable that after the fact, in a conversation with the police from her home, that Ms.
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Butters, while shaking and crying, could retain enough composure that the police would
not need to ask her to calm down.
Mr. Herbert's failure to accurately represent testimony and evidence demonstrates
a failure to meet the marshaling requirement. As such, his requests for relief should be
denied.
H.

THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE DISTRICT COURT'S ENTERING THE
CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION.
A.

The trial court observed the parties and many witnesses during the
two-day hearing and made detailed findings of fact evaluating each
confrontation between the parties in support of its decision.

At the threshold, there is no doubt the trial court was in the best position to assess
the demeanor and posture of the parties and other witnesses during the two-day hearing.
In fact, the trial court made specific findings as to each party's behavior. The trial court
noted its duty to "candidly and forthrightly evaluate the credibility of some of the
witnesses and that [it] make some specific findings." (R. 285:143.)
i.

Ms. Butters' testimony was reliable and credible.

The trial court found Ms. Butters' testimony reasonably credible. (R. 285:144.)
Specifically, the trial noted, "I have watched Mrs. Butters in this case, her appearance in
court has been reasonably credible. I haven't discerned an unreasonable attempt to stretch
or overstate her memory. Certainly with every witness she remembers some details, she
doesn't remember others but in general I found her presentation to be credible and
reasonable." (R. 285:144.) The trial court also found Ms. Butters to be "more emotional
than the usual person that comes to court a n d . . . that she is not an accurate evaluator of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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distance or time . . . . [S]he is influenced by fears and concerns that her mother and the
rest of her family have." (R. 295:143-144.)
ii. Mr, Herbert's demeanor appeared arrogant and his testimony was
unreliable and minimized or exaggerated where convenient
The trial court made several findings as to Mr. Herbert's unfavorable demeanor
and unbelievable testimony. The court found that Mr. Herbert's "posture while sitting at
the table and at the witness stand tends to create an impression of arrogance." (R.
285:144.) These observations reflect the importance of the trial court's evaluating
testimony in person and why the standard of review for such findings is that of clear error.
The trial court also observed that Mr. Herbert has a "direct and almost unblinking and
intense stare . . . ." (R. 285:144.) Mr. Herbert's stare was the subject of many of the
encounters with Ms. Butters and Mr. Herbert, and it is important that the trial court
observed that simple "fact" as it indicates the reliability of Ms. Butters testimony. (R.
285:144.)
In addition, the trial court found that Mr. Herbert's "memory and testimony of
specific events . .. minimized or exaggerated when convenient." (R. 285:145.) By way of
illustration, at the hearing, there was evidence that Mr. Herbert pled guilty to disorderly
conduct for lewd behavior [unrelated to Ms. Butters] in University Mall in February 2004.
(R. 284:174, 284:180, 285:69.) The trial court noted that "Mr. Crabb's testimony of the
nature and circumstances of the interview [at University Mall] with Mr. Herbert was
credible and was consistent with [Mr. Herbert's] recollection of the events. [However,
Mr. Herbert's] recollection, his testimony about that event.. . minimized and
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contradicted Officer Crabb's credible testimony specifically about Mr. Herbert's
confession." (R. 285:145.) Contrary to Mr. Herbert's testimony, it was apparent to the
trial court that Mr. Herbert "knew the . . . specific nature of the allegations [against him]"
(R. 285:146) and that he confessed to Mr. Crabb that he was "masturbating in his pants"
or, in Mr. Herbert's terminology (according to Mr. Crabb) that Mr. Herbert confessed "he
was playing with his penis" in Nordstrom while watching a female employee work. (R.
284:177-178.)5
Mr. Herbert and Ms. Butters' testimony conflicted as to whether Mr. Herbert saw
Ms. Butters in the Riverwoods encounter. {Compare R. 285:23 with R. 284:45.) The trial
court found that "it was credible that there, in fact, was a confrontation [with Mr. Herbert
and Ms. Butters' family and ] . . . they were afraid. They had seen Mr. Herbert. It was
obvious that they were avoiding him and they were hiding at the back of the store. He
confronted them directly and said, ["]Are you hiding[?"]. It is incredible that he didn't
observe or note the presence of [Ms.] Butters, particularly given that later in other
circumstances he quickly recognize[d] and identified her as a sister and member of the
family." (R. 285:146.) The trial court also noted that during the Riverwoods confrontation
Mr. Herbert "was aware of the family including [Ms. Butters]. He directly confronted

5

While the Court did not highlight it specifically, Mr. Crabb testified that Mr. Herbert
knew Mr. Crabb was "coming [towards Mr. Herbert] and that [Mr. Herbert] was
attempting to get away... [with Mr. Crabb] on a dead run" behind him. (R. 284: 177).
On the other hand, Mr. Herbert testified that he "kind of scampered through the food
court and kind of got out of there [after seeing the officer approach him]." (R. 285:34.)
Mr. Herbert's self-serving minimization of his conduct is consistent with the trial court's
findings.
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them while they were cowering in the back of the store, attempting to avoid him.5' (R.
285:148.)
The trial court also found to a preponderance regarding the Gold's Gym incident in
the winter of 2004-2005, that Mr. Herbert "was intently watching [Ms.] Butters while she
exercised and that he was watching in a posture which could reasonably have been
interpreted to be conduct similar to the accusations from University Mall." The trial court
made no finding of any lewd act in the University Mall incident, but the trial court noted
that Mr. Herbert "should have know[n] the nature of the accusations from the mall and
avoided being placed in a circumstance where he could be accused of committing the
same kind of conduct." (R. 285:148.) Again, the trial court's finding is supported by the
evidence.
The trial court also specifically found that Mr. Herbert's testimony about the
assault on BYU campus "minimized the nature of that circumstance." (R. 285:146.) Mr.
Herbert testified he touched Ms. Akana's shoulders as "kind of a pretend shake." (R.
285:31.) Ms. Akana testified Mr. Herbert choked her and "put both his hands around [her]
neck and he just started shaking [her]." (R. 284:9.) Mr. Herbert was charged with assault
and restrained from going on BYU campus as a result of the incident. (R. 284:10; R.
285:72-75.) Mr. Herbert claimed the assault charge was "just dismissed." (R. 285:48.) In
fact, Mr. Herbert entered a guilty plea in abeyance wherein the assault charges were
dismissed if Mr. Herbert pled guilty to the violation of the injunction. (R. 285:72-75; see
also Addendum, Plaintiffs Exhibit 10.) Again, the court's finding is supported by the
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evidence. (R. 284:4, 284:10.)
Mr. Herbert claimed not to know or recognize Ms. Butters until after August 2008,
well after the 2005 Injunction issued. (R. 285:22-23, 285:40.) However, Mr. Herbert still
had a copy of the 2005 stalking injunction in his car in August 2011. (R. 285:61.) The
trial court found that Mr. Herbert's "memory of the specific restraining order that he
stipulated to is not credible. It's just simply not believable that [Ms.] Butters would have
been a specifically named respondent and that he would not have been able to recognize
her and made it his business to recognize her because the consequence of violating an
order like that are significant and serious. It isn't believable that he would still have it in
his possession years later and have no knowledge or acquaintance with [Ms.] Butters."
(R. 284:147.)
Mr. Herbert also acknowledged that he violated the 2005 Injunction and order
banning himfromBYU (as a result of the assault) because he had "pre-purchased tickets
to this event and [he] wanted to see it." (R. 285:65.) The trial court noted that the incident
was "only relevant to this case to the extent that it demonstrates credibility to his conduct.
He specifically knew of the restraining order and intentionally violated the order and did
so . . . with a casual attitude reflected in his testimony...." (R. 285:147.)
In light of the trial court's observation of the testimony and demeanor of the
witnesses and its specific findings afterward, the trial court's ruling should be affirmed.
B.

The trial court'sfindingssupport a stalking injunction against Mr.
Herbert under U.C.A. §76-5-106.5(2)(a) and (b).

The trial court appropriately considered and weighed the evidence before it and
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concluded that a civil stalking injunction was appropriate. A civil stalking injunction is
available when a petitioner proves "by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of
the petitioner by the respondent occurred." Utah Code. Ann. § 77-3a-101(7). Stalking is
defined in the civil context the same as in the criminal context. See Utah Code Ann. § 773a-101(1). In relevant part and in the criminal context, a person commits stalking if he
"intentionally and knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person
and knows or should know that the course of conduct would case a reasonable person: (a)
to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or (b) to suffer other
emotional distress." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2). A "course of conduct" is defined as
two or more acts directed at or toward a specific person, including:
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs,
serveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes with
a person's property:
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone
else to engage in any of these acts:
(A) approaches or confronts a person" and other inapplicable
actions.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(1 )(b). A "reasonable person" means "a reasonable person
in the victim's circumstances." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(l)(e). And emotional
distress means "significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or
other professional treatment or counseling is required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5106.5(l)(d).
Applying the statute to the case at hand requires statutory interpretation. In
considering the apphcation of this statute to a specific stalking case, this Court has clearly
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stated that the "goal when confronted with questions of statutory interpretation is to
evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature." Bott v. Osburn, 2011 UT App 139,
\ 85 257 P.3d 1022 (internal citations omitted). Further, it "is axiomatic that the best
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Id. By way of
illustration,"[l]ooking to the plain language" of the statute reveals that, while establishing
the elements of stalking requires the trial court finding that the alleged stalker had the
intent to engage in a course of conduct that he knew or should have known would a cause
a reasonable person to fear or suffer emotional distress, "there is no requirement that the
trial court also find that the victim was actually afraid or distressed." Id. "Thus, the statute
is plain on its face and no further analysis is necessary to discern the legislature's intent."
Id. In addition, "[s]talking, by its very nature, is an offense of repetition," the "conduct is
rendered... more threatening because it is repeated" and should not be considered in a
vacuum; rather, the conduct at issue should be considered cumulatively "in the context of
the facts and circumstances of the individual case." Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, fflf
25-33, 136 P.3d 1242.
The trial court found that "when Mr. Herbert took the actions he did, he did so
knowingly and intentionally. There's no evidence that he did anything [b]y mistake or that
this was thoughtless action." (R. 285:150.) For example, the trial court found that, by a
preponderance of the evidence, Mr. Herbert directly confronted Ms. Butters as he "drove
directly at her and he deliberately circled her vehicle in a confrontive manner." (R.
285:148.) Similarly, in the University Mall parking lot incident in 2009, the court found it
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credible that Ms. Butters would have called University Mall security (as she was a former
employee of Nordstrom) and because she knew there was a restraining order directing
him to stay awayfromthe mall. (R. 285:149.) Again, to a preponderance, the trial court
found Mr. Herbert's actions reflect that Mr. Herbert walked directly to Ms. Butters, stood
in close proximity, and then continued to watch her from a distance. (R. 285:149.)
In sum, the trial court found five incidents sustained by the evidence that Mr.
Herbert approached, monitored, observed, or confronted Ms. Butters directly: (1) the
confrontation at Riverwoods, (2) the Gold's Gym incident in 2004-2005, (3) the Smith's
incident on April 2009, (4) the University Mall incident in July 2009, and (5) the Gold's
Gym incident on August 4, 2010. (R. 285:150.) The trial court also noted that "given the
history of [Mr. Herbert's] problems at the [University] Mall and the prior orders and
confrontations with the family,... the evidence reasonably establishes that he did know
and recognize [Ms.] Butters and that he knew or should have known that the conduct
would cause a reasonable person in those circumstances to suffer emotional distress." (R.
285:150-151.) The combined effect of these incidents, and other reliable evidence,
justifies the stelking injunction at issue.
The five incidents sustained by the evidence demonstrate that Mr. Herbert's
conduct would not only cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress under the
circumstances, but also cause a reasonable person to fear for the person's own safety.
Throughout the two-day hearing the evidence spoke to both prongs of Utah Code
Annotated Section § 76-5-106.5(2), and in Ms. Butter's closing her counsel argued that
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both standards applied. (R. 285:103-104.) As the trial court explicitly, stated that Mr.
Herbert knew or should have known his conduct would cause a reasonable person to
suffer emotional distress, or Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-106.5(2)(b), this section
will address the emotional distress aspect before addressing the fear for safety aspect of
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-106.5(2)(a).
z. Mr. Herbert's actions and the trial court's findings support a civil
stalking injunction under U.C.A. §76-5-106.5(2)(b).
As noted above, under the stalking injunction statute, emotional distress means
"significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or other
professional treatment or counseling is required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(l)(d).
The definition requires no interpretation. As highlighted in the facts section, the record is
full of instances where Ms. Butters indicated she experienced emotional distress and
many other witnesses identified the same emotional distress.
The Smith's incident made Ms. Butters "really upset" because she remembered the
Gold's Gym incident where Mr. Herbert had been touching himself while watching her,
and the incident where Mr. Herbert choked her sister. (R. 284:53.) She was scared by Mr.
Herbert circling her car. (R. 284:74.) Ms. Butters testified she was crying and shaking in
fear as a result of Mr. Herbert driving around her car repeatedly. (R. 284:75.)
In the University Mall parking lot incident upset Ms. Butters. (R. 284:83.) Ms.
Butters noted that "every time there is an incident with [Mr. Herbert] I . . . need some
emotional support

" (R. 284:82.) The Orem Library incident made Ms. Butters shake

in fear. (R. 284:58,284:85.)
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The August 4 Gold's Gym incident was particularly distressing. When she was
walking in and he was walking out she said, "Please leave me alone." (R. 284:91.) Mr.
Herbert's circling her car on foot scared Ms. Butters, and she went to an employee and
asked if she could stand by him. (R. 284:60.) She repeatedly told the employee that she
was scared. (R. 284:94-95.) Mr. Phillips, another employee testified that Ms. Butters was
"[o]bviously... in distress." (R. 284:149.) When Mr. Herbert paced behind her and
stared, Mr. Herbert's behavior scared Ms. Butters and made her feel like he was "raping
her with his eyes." (R. 284:60-61.) Clearly Ms. Butters was emotionally distressed and
that distress continued at the police station. Tara Calancea, the Customer Service
Specialist at the Orem Police Department who interacted with both Ms. Butters and Mr.
Herbert, said that when Ms. Butters learned Mr. Herbert had been at the station Ms.
Butters cried "for quite a few minutes" and that she "had never seen someone that upset
before...." (R. 284:119.)
As the trial court found, the actions directed by Mr. Herbert towards Ms. Butters,
coupled with the history of the parties prior to the stalking incidents, would cause a
reasonable person in Ms. Butters' shoes to experience significant mental or psychological
suffering, or emotional distress.
ii. Mr. Herbert's actions and the trial court's findings support a civil
stalking injunction under U.C.A. §76-5-106.5(2)(a).
Ms. Butters also feared for her safety many times as a result of her encounters with
Mr. Herbert. When considering whether a reasonable person would fear for his safety, it
is not necessary that "each act or incident independently be such as to cause a reasonable
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person to fear for his or her safety; rather, it is the pattern of behavior or the course of
conduct considered in the context of the circumstances that must have that cumulative
effect." Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App 136,1 13, 253 P.3d 1121.
Again, the record is full of examples where Ms. Butters and others testify as to Ms.
Butters fear for her own safety. Each incident cited directly above reflect incidents where
Ms. Butters feared for her safety. In addition, Ms. Butters clearly testified that Mr.
Herbert's actions made her feel scared, invaded, and intimidated. (R. 284:87.) Ms. Butters
also acknowledged that her greatest fear was that she or another victim would end up
dead. (R. 284:88.) Even Mr. Workman, the Governor's security detail, testified that he
heard Ms. Butters tell the police that she was scared she would "end up in a ditch." (R.
285:13.)
Ms. Butters was aware of the Nordstrom's masturbation incident that resulted in
Mr. Herbert's banishment from University Mall. (R. 285:40.) She knew Mr. Herbert was
behind her in the Gold's Gym in 2004 when he allegedly touched himself inappropriately
while watching her intently. (R. 284:26-27; 284:46-48.) She had been named on a
stalking injunction against Mr. Herbert before. (R. 284:4.) The encounters with Mr.
Herbert were escalating from driving around her car, to staring at her in a parking lot, to
circling her car on foot, to pacing behind her. When he paced behind her and stared, it
made her feel like he was "raping her with his eyes." (R. 284:60-61.) Mr. Herbert made
Ms. Butters felt like she would be hurt or killed. And a reasonable person in her shoes
would have felt the same fear. The stalking injunction is justified.
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in. MR. HERBERT DID NOT RAISE OR PRESERVE HIS OBJECTION AS
TO THE APPLICABILITY OF THE OUTRAGEOUS AND
INTOLERABLE STANDARD IN THE TRIAL COURT, AND, IN ANY
CASE, THE OUTRAGEOUS AND INTOLERABLE TORT STANDARD IS
INAPPLICABLE TO THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE.
Mr. Herbert failed to indicate his objection to the legal standard used by the trial
court and therefore failed to preserve the issue for appeal. For the first time, on appeal,
Mr. Herbert argues that the trial court should have used the definition of "emotional
distress" utilized by Utah courts in assessing a claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The general rule is that "issues not raised at trial cannot be argued for
the first time on appeal." Burleigh v. Friel, 2005 UT App 358, If 6, 121 P.3d 51 (citing
Monson v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Utah 1996)). In his Appellant's Brief, Mr.
Herbert cites to R. 286:9 (oral argument on February 25,2011 regarding attorney's fees),
as grounds for preserving the issue of the outrageous and intolerable standard for the case
at hand. (Appellant's Brief at 1.) At best, at that point in the record, Mr. Herbert's counsel
made an assertion that Ms. Butters was less than reliable and that Mr. Herbert contested
the stalking injunction. (R. 286:9.) This vague and inapplicable oral argument does not
have anything to do with preserving the an objection to the legal standards applicable to a
stalking injunction. If this Court is to find that Mr. Herbert preserved any issues for
appeal with such vague argument, then the Court is creating precedent to allow almost
any issue to be preserved with the most insignificant reference below.
Further, there was no argument as to the outrageous and intolerable standard
during the two-day hearing. The parties and the trial court correctly relied on the plain
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meaning of the statute.
Even if this Court concludes that the issue was preserved, the definition of
"emotional distress" is contained within the stalking injunction statute, and there is no
need, as Mr. Herbert argues, to look to other legal definitions.
Specifically, there is no reason to look to tort law for the definition of a term that is
explicitly defined by statute. Mr. Herbert argues that the legislative intent of the 2008
statute indicates that the legislature intended to utilize the tort definition of emotional
distress in the statute. However, as the Bott court aptly noted, it "is axiomatic that the best
evidence of legislative intent is the plain language of the statute itself." Bott v. Osburn,
2011 UT App 139, Tj 8, 257 P.3d 1022 (internal citations omitted). The plain language
could not be plainer: "emotional distress," as clearly defined in the stalking injunction
statute, means "significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical or
other professional treatment or counseling is required." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5106.5(l)(d). The legislature chose a specific definition of "emotional distress." The trial
court correctly used that definition in evaluating Ms. Butters's application for a stalking
injunction. If successful, Mr. Herbert's argument would amount to eliminating a clearly
defined term in favor of a definition that contradicts the plain wording of the statute. Such
result is untenable.
Further, the statute requires a "course of conduct [that] would case a reasonable
person: (a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or (b) to
suffer other emotional distress." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (emphasis added). The
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statute plainly states that a person's fearing for his or her own safety, or that of a third
person, is one type of emotional distress that justifies a stalking injunction. "Other" forms
of emotional distress also justify a stalking injunction.
Mr. Herbert's argument cuts against a plain reading of the statute because the tort
definition of emotional distress would not include all types of a person's fearing for his or
her own safety or that of a third person, except in extreme circumstances. Clearly the case
law interpreting the statute (discussed in greater detail below) does not require the tort
definition in its application of fear for safety as justification for a stalking injunction. See,
e.g., Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App 136. If Mr. Herbert's argument about the tort
definition were correct, then the entire first prong of the statute regarding fear for safety
would be subsumed in the second prong for emotional distress. Simply stated, the statute
does not require the tort definition in its application of emotional distress.
The case law Mr. Herbert relies upon does not justify Ms position that the
outrageous and intolerable standard is applicable. In fact, the cases cited in his brief
which involve stalking do not support his position, largely because the legislature
modified the stalking injunction statute in 2008 and included a specific definition of
"emotional distress." For example, Mr. Herbert cites to Allen v. Anger, 2011 UT App 19,
248 P.3d 1001, as support for applying the tort definition. However, the Allen court
specifically notes that whether the Lopez standard is overruled by the explicit definition in
the 2008 statute "and whether it would be effective in doing so, are questions beyond the
scope of today's decision." Allen, 2011 UT App 19 at \ 16, n.4.
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Further, in another case cited by Mr. Herbert, this Court noted that "it recently
acknowledged that, due to recent amendments to the Stalking Statute, the emotional
distress requirement may have changed." Coombs v. Dietrich, 2011 UT App 136, ^f 11
n.2, 253 P.3d 1121 (citing Allen, 2011 UT App 19 at If 16, n.4). However in Coombs, the
decision was "based on the fear for safety provision of the Stalking Statute, [not the
emotional distress provision, so the Court did] not reach that issue." Id.
The other stalking case Mr. Herbert relies upon is Wallace v. Van Pelt, 969 S.W.2d
380 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998). Wallace is neither instructive nor binding precedent, as it relies
on a different statutory scheme and judiciary precedent, and should be disregarded.
Mr. Herbert also argues that it is plain error not to apply the outrageous and
intolerable standard to the emotional distress in the stalking statute as referenced in Salt
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The Utah Rules of Evidence
provide that a "court may take notice of a plain error affecting a substantial right, even if
the claim of error was not properly preserved." Utah R. Evid. 103(e). "The first
requirement for a finding of plain error is that the error be 'plain,5 i.e., from [the Court's]
examination of the record, [it] must be able to say that it should have been obvious to a
trial court that it was committing error.5' State v. Eldredge, 111 P. 2d 29, 35 (Utah 1989)
(internal citation omitted). "The second and somewhat interrelated requirement for a
finding of plain error is that the error affect the substantial rights of the accused, i.e., that
the error be harmful." Id.
This Court has previously touched on the precise issue Mr. Herbert raises. The
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party appealing a stalking injunction in Bott argued "that [this Court's] decisions in Salt
Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and its progeny hold that [the
alleged stalker's] conduct must be outrageous in order to satisfy the emotional distress
prong of the stalking statute and that the trial court could not make such a finding based
on [the alleged stalker's] conduct [in that case]." Bott v. Osbum, 2011 UT App 139, ^18.
The Lopez court explained that the "[e]motional distress results from conduct that is
outrageous and intolerable in that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency
and morality." Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1264 (internal quotation omitted). However, "the Lopez
court looked to tort law to define 'emotional distress' because the prior version of the
stalking statute did not contain a definition for that term." Bott, 2011 UT App 139 at ^[18;
compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2003) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2008).
"The Utah appellate courts have not yet had occasion to decide whether Lopez is still
relevant in light of the legislature's subsequent adoption of a statutory definition of
emotional distress." Bott, 2011 UT App 139 at If 18.
However, this Court did not leave us in the dark as to which way the wind is
blowing as to the emotional distress standard. For example, this Court stated that "even if
the language of the criminal stalking statute left us with doubt as to the current elements
of stalking, the fact that the legislature deleted the language imposing a requirement that
the defendant's conduct actually induce fear or cause emotional distress can mean
nothing but that the legislature's purpose deliberately was to remove the requirement"
Id. at \ 9 (emphasis added). Further, "[w]hen the legislature undertakes to amend a
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statute, it indicates a legislative intent to change the law.5' Id. (internal citation omitted).
Similarly, if the legislature added a definition of emotional distress in the statute, it
indicates a legislative intent to change the law.
Thus the Bott court's reasoning suggests that relying on the specifically defined
term in the 2008 statute is reasonable, and not indicative that the trial court committed
error. As such, the plain error standard is not met.
Finally, from a policy perspective Mr. Herbert's position fails. It makes no sense to
apply the definition of emotional distress from its use in intentional torts (which focuses
on the intent of the tortfeasor) and apply it to the subjective standard of a reasonable
person walking in the stalking victim's shoes.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED ITS DISCRETION IN
AWARDING REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED BY MS.
BUTTERS IN THIS MATTER.
The trial court awarded Ms. Butters her costs and attorney's fees associated in

bringing the action, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-3a-101(16). (R.
285:151; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16) ("After a hearing with notice to the
affected party, the court may enter an order requiring any party to pay the costs of the
action, including reasonable attorney fees.").)
Under Utah law, attorney fees are awardable only if authorized by statute or by
contract. See Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699 P.2d 730, 734 (Utah 1985).
Awarding attorney's fees is clearly authorized by statute after a hearing on a civil stalking
injunction. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(16). Notably, the statute does not require a
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party to prevail at the hearing in order to be awarded costs or fees. Rather, the standard
appears entirely discretionary.
In this case, the trial court specifically found that Ms. Butters prevailed by a
preponderance of the evidence. (R. 285:151.) The trial court also found Ms. Butters
"appearance in court was reasonably credible/' while Mr. Herbert's appearance was
arrogant and his testimony "minimi zed or exaggerated when convenient." (R. 285:144145.) Further, as support for the award, the trial court provided a detailed oral ruling,
discussing various witnesses and their respective testimony and virtually all evidence
presented over the two-day hearing. (R. 285:143-152.) In fact, the trial court specifically
reviewed each event when Ms. Butters and Mr. Herbert crossed paths and found that Mr.
Herbert's actions were knowing and intentional and justified the stalking injunction at
issue. (R. 285:150.)
As noted earlier; the trial court found that five incidents sustained by the evidence
that Mr. Herbert approached, monitored, observed, or confronted Ms. Butters directly: (1)
the confrontation at Riverwoods, (2) the Gold's Gym incident in 2004-2005, (3) the
Smith's incident on April 2009, (4) the University Mall incident in My 2009, and (5) the
Gold's Gym incident on August 4, 2010. (R. 285:150.) The trial court also found that Mr.
Herbert knew and recognized Ms. Butters, and that he knew or should have known that
his conduct would cause a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. (R. 285:151.)
In light of this evidence, the trial court ordered Mr. Herbert to pay a portion of Ms.
Butters's attorneys'fees.
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Mr. Herbert argues that attorney's fees are inappropriate, but provides no case law
or argument support of his argument asidefromconclusory statements that he contests the
award. This does not meet the marshaling requirement. Further, the trial court provided
ample justification for its award of attorneys' fees and did not abuse its discretion in
awarding Ms. Butters her fees and costs. In fact, at oral argument on the issue of
attorney's fees, while the trial court acknowledged that the standard is discretionary, that
Ms. Butters prevailed, and that she was entitled to some attorney's fees, the trial court
actually reduced Ms. Butters' award for attorney's fees from $19,889.50 to $9,837.00 (by
interlineation) on the basis that the figure provided by Ms. Butters was excessive. (R.
270; see also R. 286:15-16.)
The award of attorney's fees in this matter is reasonable and justified and should
be affirmed. And, as a prevailing party who was awarded attorney fees below, Ms.
Butters should be awarded her attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal. See, e.g., Elman v.
Elman, 2002 UT App 83,143, 45 P.3d 176.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should dismiss Mr. Herbert's appeal, affirm
the stalking injunction and attorneys' fees award from the district court, and award Ms.
Butters her attorneys' fees incurred in this appeal.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of January 2012.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, LC

Stephen Quesenberry
Jessica Griffin Anderson
Mark R. Nelson
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee
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MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
Attorneys for Respondent
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-0700

,;

r

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TALEIMOANA WEINGARTEN,

:
STIPULATION

Petitioner,
*

vs.

:
*

NATHAN G. HERBERT,
Respondent.

:

Case No. 050402221
Charges:
Judge:

:.

COMES NOW, the Petitioner, Talei Moana Weingarten, and her Attorney, Gregory G.
Skordas, and the Respondent, Nathan Herbert and his Attorney, Michael L Petro of Young,
Kester & Petro, and stipulate and agree that the Ex Parte Civil Stalking Injunction in this matter
shall be modified and entered as a Civil Stalldng Injunction with the following provisions:
1.

The Respondent is enjoined from stalking the Petitioner, as defined in § §77-3a-

101, et eeq. and § 76-5-106.5 of the Utah Code Annotated.
2.

The Respondent shall be enjoined from going near the Peteitioner5 s

residence at 973 East 1030 "North, Orem, Utah, or any other residence where Petitioner personally
resides.

.

--•.

3. •" Respondent is restrained form contacting the petitioner, directly or indirectly,
through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means and the
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Respondent is restrained form contacting the following persons: Sister - Aiona Butters,
4.

The Stalking Injunction shall remain in full force and effect for three years after

the date of this agreement
5.

The parties stipulate that they have reviewed the provisions found herein, that they

understand each and every provision herein, and that they agi'ee to be bound by the provisions
herein.
DATED this

day of

s

2005.

NATHAN G. HERBERT
Respondent
DATED this

day of

, 2005.

TALEIMOANA WHNGARTEN
Petitioner
DATED this

day of

t

,2005.

MICHAEL LPETRO
Attorney for Respondent
DATED this

day of

, 2005.

GREGORY G. SKORDAS
Attorney for P etitioner
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MICHAEL J. PETRO (4241)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
Attorneys for Resp ondent
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-0700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TALEI MO ANA WEINGARTEN,
CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION
Petitioner,

:
*

-vs.

NATHAN G. HERBERT,
Respondent,

:

Case No, 050402221
Charges:
Judge:

;

This matter came on before the Court on the parties' stipulation. The Petitioner, Talei
Moana Weingarten being represented by Gregory G. Skordas of Skordas, Caston & Miller and
the Respondent, Nathan G. Herbert, being represented by Michael J, Petro of Young, Kester &
Petro. The Court, having reviewed the file and being fully advised in the premises, an pursuant to
Utah Code Annotated 77-3a-101? et seq., now makes and enters the following:
1.

The Respondent is enjoinedfromstalking the Petitioner, as defined in §§77-3a-1015

et seq. and § 76-5-106,5 of the Utah Code Annotated.
2.

The Respondent shall be enjoined from going near the Petitioner's residence at

973 East 1030 North, Orem, Utah, or any other residence where Petitioner personally resides.
3.

Respondent is restrained form contacting the petitioner, directly or indirectly,

through any form of communication including written, oral, or electronic means and the Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IS

restrained form contacting the following persons; Sister - Aiona Butters,
4.

The Stalking Injunction shall remain in fall force and effect for three years after

the date of this agreement.
DATED this

day of

, 2005,

JUDGE
District Court Judge

Approved as to form:
GMGORY G. SKORDAS
Attorney for Petitioner
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Defendant's Exhibit 9
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MICHAEL J. PETRO (42-N
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
Attorneys for Defendant
75 South 300 West
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 379-0700
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH. PROVO DEPARTMENT

PROVO CITY,

•

:
PLEA IN ABEYANCE

Plaintiff,

:

v.

:

Case No. 051403891 & 051403892

NATHAN HERBERT,

:

Judge Lynn W. Davis

Defendant.

:

COMES NOW the plaintiff, by and through counsel, Rick Romney. Provo CityProsecutor, and the defendant. Nathan Herbert, by and through his attorney, Michael J. Petro, and
subject to the approval of the Court, do hereby enter into the following Plea in Abeyance
Agreement, and do covenant, promise and agree as follows:

Plea Agreement
Case No. 05-1403892 which charges Assault aQS^®j||^gJne@.cSSIi : S|!g|
|h'srr|t|sat upon Defendant's no contest plea in case no. 05-1403891

^^L\f IN ftg-

Case No. 05-1403891 Tne defendant w i l l g ^ g ^ ^ f | s f | f b Violation of Stalf
i CERTIFY THAT THi

Injunction, a Class "A" Misdemeanor.

AN ORIGINAL DOCi
FOURTH JUDICIAL
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Provo City v. Herbert, Case Nos. 05-1403891 & 05-1403892
Pase 2

1.

After investigation concerning the offense charged, together with the defendants

would be proper to enter into a plea in abeyance agreement for the previously mentioned count of
Stalking, a Class "A" Misdemeanor.
2.

The parties, pursuant hereto, and subject to the approval of the Court, agrees to

hold defendant's plea of guilty, in abeyance for a period of Twelve (12) months, from the date
hereof upon the terms and conditions herein set forth.
The defendant acknowledges that if the conditions and terms of this Plea in Abeyance
Agreement are violated, the Provo City Prosecutor's Office, or the Court, on its own motion, mayissue an order requiring the defendant to appear before the court at a designated time and place to
show cause why the court should not find the terms of the agreement violated and why die
agreement should not be terminated. IT following an evidentiary hearing, the court finds that me
defendant has failed to substantially comply with any term or condition of the plea in abeyance
agreement, it may terminate the agreement and enter judgment of conviction and impose
sentence against the defendant for the offense to which the original plea was entered.
.3.

The defendant hereby represents that he/she has read and understands all of the

provisions of this Plea in Abeyance Agreement and specifically agrees, promises and covenants
to abide thereby.
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Plea in Abeyance
Provo City v. Herbert, Case Nos. 05-1403893 & 05-1403892
Page3

4.

The defendant further represents thai he/she has the right, pursuant to Rule 22 of

the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, to be sentenced not less than two (2) nor more than forty
five (45) days after the verdict or plea, and he/she specifically, hno^ingiy and mrelhgemiy
waives the above said right.
5.

The defendant agrees that his/her guilty plea will be held in abeyance for a period

of twelve (12) months and that during the duration of said time, the defendant specifically agrees
to comply with the following terms and conditions:
a.

The defendant agrees that he/she shall not violate any municipal,
county, state or federal laws, other than minor traffic offenses.

b.

The defendant agrees to report to the Court when requested.

c.

'The defendant agrees that he will not change his permanent address
without first notifying the Court.

.^S^^^^^^^nty
e.

JSIllI^^
g S g D « ^ g M i ^ 9 9 No. Freedom Boulevard, Provo, Utah, telephone (801)
373-1273.

f.

That the defendant shall complete any other requirements as may be agreed to
between the parties.
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Prove Ciry v. Herbert, Case Nos. 05-1403891 & 05-1403892
Pa?e 4

g.

That the defendant shall have no coniact with the alleged victim or her immediate
family members, either personally, through electronic or telephone means, or
through any intermediary

6.

I§5pB^^

agien^

NATHAN G. HERBERT
Defendant

j/sUM.

MICHAEL J. PETRO
Attorney for Defendant

&vk

Date

^

f

f^n-r^Ar\

RICKROMNEY
/I
Provo City Prosecuio?

f/otfo-?-

Date

'~ ^- Ql

Dare

Approval

Based upon the motion of the plaintiff and defendant, and good cause appearing therefor:
IT' IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above plea in abeyance agreement by approved by
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Provo d r y v. Herbert. Case Nos. 05-I403S91 &. 05-1403892

ement period to be for twelve (12) months.
DATED this

^-~"~"dav oi

^/yyi^^-^j^rr-.

/ L ! $ 5 N W. DAVIS
District Court Judge
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